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The study assesses the level of integration among the three Greater China economies (namely 
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and examines the suitability of a Greater China currency union. 
Currently, the three economies have extensive trade and investment linkages. Our analyses show 
that these economies share common long-run and short-run cyclical variations. We also estimate 
the output costs of relinquishing policy autonomy to form a currency union. The estimated 
output losses, which depend on, for example, the method used to generate shock estimates, seem 
to be moderate and are likely to be less than the efficient gains derived from a currency union 
arrangement.  
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The economic entity comprising of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan is referred to 
by different names. The common ones include Greater China, China Circle, and Chinese 
economic area.
1 Expectedly, the exact geographic coverage of these terms depends on the 
time and context in which they are referred to and differs across users. In this study, we 
adopt the term Greater China (DaZhongHua in Chinese) despite the potential resentment 
caused by the similarity between this term and the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere,” which was proposed by Japan during World War II.  
Greater China is one of the most dynamic regions in the world. Its importance to 
the global economy has been widely anticipated since the reforms in China began in 
1978.
2 The Greater China’s extraordinary growth rates in GDP and trade, especially 
China, in the last 20 years has dwarfed those of developed economies. While the upsurge 
of Greater China is attributable to the economic transition in China, it also reflects the 
success of the export oriented development policy pursued by these economies. The three 
economies have strong complementary assets – China has rich and low-cost resources, 
Taiwan has advanced technological know-how and capital, and Hong Kong offers 
capital, sophisticated financial services, modern management skills, and a well-developed 
legal system. Consequently, the integration of these economies offers tremendous 
synergy that propels Greater China to a high growth trajectory. 
Since the 1997 financial crisis, the Asian economies have devoted considerable 
efforts on policy coordination and economic integration. For example, the Early Warning 
System was established to ensure financial stability in the area.
3 By the end of 2003, 
more than ten bilateral currency swap arrangements were concluded under the provisions 
                                                 
1   Harding (1993) provided a succinct account of the origins and various interpretations of the usage 
of Greater China. Naughton (1997) adopted the term China circle. The term Chinese economic 
area was used in, for example, Jones, King and Klein (1992). 
2   See, for example, Jones, King and Klein (1992), Naughton (1997), World Bank (1997), and 
Maddison (1998). 
3   The Early Warning System assesses the region’s financial stability by monitoring the balance of 
payments, the exchange rate regimes, the levels of foreign borrowing, regional and global capital 
flows, and the activities of the hedge funds in the ASEAN plus 3 countries. The ASEAN plus 3 
countries are Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, 
Burma, and Cambodia, plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 
  1of the Chiang Mai Initiative.
4 These swap arrangements were designed to pool the 
(dollar) reserves in the region together to defend against hostile speculative attacks. The 
economies in the region are also active in negotiating regional and bilateral trade 
agreements.
5  
Besides these trade and policy arrangements, there are other proposals to foster 
policy coordination and economic integration. These proposals include the establishment 
of an Asian Monetary Fund, the use of a basket of currencies as an anchor of exchange 
rates, the adoption of a dollarization policy, and the formation of an Asian currency 
union. While the notion of a currency union represents a stringent commitment by its 
member economies, it attracts some interest in the academic circle. For instance, studies 
including Bayoumi and Mauro (1999), Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999), Lee, Park and 
Shin (2002), McKinnon and Schnabl (2003), Ng (2002), and Tsang (2002) found that the 
Asian economies are not unsuitable for a currency union. However, the differences in the 
stage of economic development among these economies, the lack of effective institutional 
arrangements, and the diverse political structures are unfavorable factors for establishing 
an Asian currency union. 
It is hard to deny that there are substantial (economic and political) hurdles of 
forming a currency union among a large group of Asian economies in the near future. 
However, the prospect of a few economies to set up a currency union is not too remote. 
The theme of the current study is to assess the suitability of a currency union for Greater 
China. Undoubtedly, the interaction between the three Greater China economies is very 
intense. It is conceivable that these economies will further strengthen their economic ties, 
which can set the stage for a currency union in the future. 
                                                 
4   The Chiang Mai Initiative is a regional financing network introduced by the ASEAN plus 3 
countries in May 2002. Technically, the initiative is an expansion of the ASEAN swap 
arrangement to include the three newcomers. See, for example, Henning (2002) and Bergsten and 
Park (2002) for discussions on the Chiang Mai Initiative and the construction of a regional 
financial arrangement in East Asia. 
5   For example, the recently concluded free trade agreements in Asian region include the ASEAN-
China Free Trade agreement, the China-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, 
China-Macau free trade pact, and Japan-Singapore free trade agreement. At the same time, Japan-
ASEAN free trade agreement and South Korea-Singapore free trade agreement are under 
negotiation, and China-Japan-Korea free trade agreement and China-Taiwan free trade agreement 
have been proposed. 
  2The standard literature considers a few criteria for an optimum currency area.
6 
Business cycle synchronization is one of the criteria used to evaluate the desirability of a 
currency union. Other criteria include the similarities of trade patterns and levels of 
economic development, the degree of trade and financial integration, and the mobility of 
labor markets. In this exercise, we focus on the business cycle synchronization criterion. 
When business cycles across economies are synchronous, the cost of using a single 
currency is reduced because there is less need for asymmetric monetary policy responses 
to common shocks, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, currency union may not be an 
optimal monetary arrangement when the economies display asynchronous business 
cycles. 
In the literature, various approaches are adopted to assess the contemporaneous 
correlation of output shocks, which is commonly used to gauge the degree of business 
cycle synchronization (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Lee, Park and Shin, 2002; 
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro, 2002). Contemporaneous correlation, however, does not 
necessarily provide a complete picture.
 7 The effects of shocks on economies crucially 
depend on the transmission mechanism within and across them. Divergent monetary or 
exchange rate policies may deem necessary even in the presence of high shock 
correlation if the transmission mechanisms are sufficiently different among the 
economies. On the other hand, a relatively low contemporaneous shock correlation does 
not exclude the possibility that the economies are in similar phases of the business cycle 
and, hence, does not require different monetary or exchange rate policies. In view of this 
consideration, we consider a complementary approach and directly examine comovement 
patterns of output series. 
The current exercise assesses both long-run and short-run output synchronization. 
First, we investigate whether the outputs from the three Greater China economies move 
together in the long run, which is considered as a minimum requirement for a currency 
union discussion. Second, we determine whether the three economies share common 
short-run cyclical business cycles. After all, most monetary policies are devised to 
                                                 
6   Mundell (1961) is the seminal study. Some recent reviews of the literature on optimum currency 
areas are Lafrance and St-Amant (1999) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1999). 
7   Another difficulty is that output shock correlation results are not robust to different shock-
estimation methods (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Harvey and Jaeger 1993; Canova, 1998). 
  3smooth out transitory shocks. If these economies share long-run growth trends and short-
run economic fluctuations, then a single common currency is a reasonable proposition. 
To offer further insight to the prospect of establishing a Greater China currency 
union, we quantify the individual economies’ potential output losses of creating one. 
Since the ideal pre-conditions of a currency union are rarely fulfilled, there is always a 
cost for an economy to relinquish policy autonomy and join a currency union. Thus, in 
addition to business cycle synchronization, it is instructive to estimate the individual 
economies’ potential costs of joining a currency union. In this exercise, we use the Ghosh 
and Wolf (1994) model to characterize the economy and evaluate output losses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
provide some background information on the trade and investment flows between the 
Greater China economies. Section 3 presents some preliminary analyses on the real per 
capita GDP data from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Patterns of output comovement 
are studied in Section 4. The Johansen cointegration test results and links between the 
long-run and short-run output interactions are reported. In the same section, we also test 
for the presence of common business cycles. Section 5 evaluates the output costs of 
forming a currency union. The output losses of Greater China and its individual member 
economies under different shock-identifying schemes and policy objectives are reported. 
Some concluding remarks are given in section 6. 
 
2.  Integration Within Greater China 
For most of the contemporary history, Hong Kong has been China’s gateway to 
the global economy. During the 1960s and 1970s, China acquired a large fraction of its 
foreign currencies via exporting goods through Hong Kong to the rest of the world. On 
the other hand, Hong Kong relied on China for its water, food, and other daily 
necessities. In the last two decades, China and Hong Kong experienced a tremendous 
increase in economic interactions. For instance, Hong Kong is a main entrepôt and 
intermediates the lion’s share of China's external trade via re-exports and offshore trade. 
Also, a substantial amount of international capital (in the form of foreign direct 
investment, equity and bond financing and syndicated loans) financing China's economic 
expansion is raised via Hong Kong. At the same time, intermediating trade and financial 
  4flows to China becomes a major form of economic activity in Hong Kong and greatly 
shapes its economic structure. 
Perhaps more surprising to a casual observer, economic links between China and 
Taiwan have proliferated since the 1990s despite ideological differences and occasional 
political tensions between these two economies. According to official statistics, China 
was the largest recipient of Taiwan’s overseas investment and Taiwan was China’s third-
largest source of foreign direct investment in 2002. Furthermore, it is widely believed 
that official statistics under-represent the overall Taiwan economic interest in China. 
Some analysts estimated that Taiwan's total investment in China is just behind Hong 
Kong’s but ahead of the US’s.  
The integration process between the three Greater China economies is proceeding 
more along de facto than de jure lines. Unlike other economic co-operative entities, the 
integration process within Greater China was not preceded and governed by explicit 
bilateral or multi-lateral (trade) agreements but fostered by the gradual liberalization 
policy in China and the relaxation of restrictions in Taiwan on its (economic) interaction 
with China.The liberalization policy offered opportunities for private sector actors to 
realize the benefits from combining strengths in these economies, which in turn further 
facilitated the liberalization process. To some observers, the growing economic 
integration among the Greater China economies reflects the triumph of economic forces 
over political constraints. 
  One way to assess the extent of integration is to look at trade and investment 
flows. These are the subjects of the next two subsections. 
  
2.1 Trade  Relationships 
China’s external trade with Hong Kong reflects the evolution of Hong Kong’s 
role as China’s gateway to the world economy. In 1991, China’s exports to Hong Kong 
reached US$32 billion, which accounted for 44.7% of China exports (Table 1). Of 
course, Hong Kong re-exported most of its imports from China to the rest of the world. 
Between 1991 and 2002, the volume of China’s exports to Hong Kong increased by 
US$26 billion. Despite the huge volume increase, the Hong Kong market only accounted 
for 18% of total China’s exports in 2002.  
  5Table 1.   Trade Between Greater China Economies, in Million US dollar  
  Hong Kong/China Taiwan/China  Taiwan/Hong Kong 
Panel A: Exports       
A.1 Export- Value      
1991 32,138 595  3,967 
2002 58,483  6,590  4,438 
A.2 Proportion      
1991 0.447  0.008  0.040 
2002 0.180  0.020  0.022 
      
Panel B: Imports       
B.1 Value      
1991 17,543  3,639  9,600 
2002 10,788  38,082  14,922 
B.2 Proportion      
1991 0.275  0.057  0.096 
2002 0.037  0.129  0.071 
      
Panel C: External Trade     
C.1: Value      
1991 49,681  4,234  13,567 
2002 69,271  44,672  19,361 
C.2: Proportion      
1991 0.366  0.031  0.068 
2002 0.112  0.072  0.047 
 
Notes:  The Table presents the trade activities between the three Greater China economies in the years 
1991 and 2002. The column labelled “XX/YY” gives the data assuming YY is the focal economy; that is, 
YY’s exports to XX, …, etc. The row label “value’ gives the value of trade activities and “Proportion” 
gives the ratio of the trade value between XX and YY to the total trade value of YY. “External Trade” 
refers to the sum of exports and imports. 
 
There are two reasons for the Hong Kong’s decreasing market share. First, in the 
process of intensifying its open door policy, China has expanded its capacity to export 
directly by establishing various direct trade links with the rest of the world and 
developing its own port and harbor facilities. These changes occurred at a fast pace in the 
1990s. Thus, China’s reliance on Hong Kong to re-export its merchandise to the rest of 
the world has, thus, been mitigated.  
Another reason is the change in the manner in which Chinese trade data are 
recorded.
8 Before 1992, the Chinese official statistics greatly distorted its trading 
                                                 
8   See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994), International Monetary Fund (1995), and an 
un-circulated International Monetary Fund internal document. 
  6relationships with its trading partners because there was no official record of final 
destinations of Chinese goods and merchandise that were exported through Hong Kong. 
This problem got international attention only when countries traded more with China and 
required information to accurately assess their trade positions with China. Starting from 
1992, China began to report its trade statistics according to the final destination of 
exports. China, with the change in reporting method, recorded a big drop in trade with 
Hong Kong – its major entrepôt in 1993. Indeed, if one excludes the 1993 figure from the 
1991-2002 sample, the average annual growth rate of China’s exports to Hong Kong 
increased from 9.23% to 13.82%. 
The evolution of China’s imports from and total trade with Hong Kong is similar 
to that of China’s exports. While China has created an extensive international trade 
network in the wake of the open door policy, Hong Kong still plays an important role in 
China trade. Given the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement signed by China and 
Hong Kong in 2003 and the proposal on developing the Pearl River Delta region, one can 
only anticipate further integration between China and Hong Kong. 
Strictly speaking, China and Taiwan do not have direct trade. Taiwan’s official 
stance was to prohibit any trade with China until the early 1990s. Since then, Taiwan has 
allowed indirect trade with China via a third territory (mainly via Hong Kong). In 1999, 
the rule was further loosened and Taiwan merchandise can transit via the third territory 
without unloading before shipping to China. Even without direct trade, the trade volume 
between these two economies has grown two times or ten times, depending on the data 
sources, in the 1990s.
9,10 According to the Chinese statistics, the trade between China and 
Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable growth – an average annual growth rate of 22%, 
since1991. Despite the phenomenal growth, Taiwan’s total external trade (exports plus 
                                                 
9   Because of trade restrictions and other political reasons, the official data from China, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong on trade between China and Taiwan are usually perceived to be incomplete. For 
instance, the value (in billions of US dollars) of total trade between China and Taiwan was 5.8 in 
1991 and 10.5 in 2001, according to Hong Kong customs (re-export) data, 0.6 in 1991 and 10.6 in 
2001 according to Taiwanese customs data, and 4.2 in 1991 and 32.4 in 2001 according to Chinese 
customs data. 
10   Apparently, steps have been taken to provide accurate China trade data. For instance, Taiwan 
authorities, despite its official ban on direct trade with China, have been asking exporters to report 
the final destination of their shipments, even if it is China. 
  7imports) with China was still less than Hong Kong’s though Taiwan exported more to 
China than Hong Kong did in 2002.  
In the early 1990s Taiwan imported only a minute amount of goods from China. 
The low level of imports reflected restrictions imposed by Taiwanese authorities 
(justified by security reasons) rather than the anaemic demand for Chinese goods in 
Taiwan. With relatively small initial exports to Taiwan, China has maintained a 
considerable trade deficit with Taiwan throughout the 1990s even though the growth rate 
of its exports to Taiwan was higher than that of imports. According to the 2002 Chinese 
figures, its trade deficit with Taiwan stood at 31.5 billion US dollars, which is 
comparable to the overall trade surplus recorded for Taiwan in the same year.
11  
Relative to China, the trade growth between Hong Kong and Taiwan is quite 
slow. The Hong Kong’s export to, import from, and total external trade with Taiwan 
registered only single-digit growth rates in the 1990s. 
The trade figures indicated that China has significantly intensified its trade 
relationship with Hong Kong and Taiwan. A smaller improvement was the trade 
relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan. The trade volume between these three 
economies was quite non-trivial in 2002, the total external trade between the three 
Greater China economies accounted for 1% of world trade. 
 
2.2  Foreign Direct Investment 
There is a technical issue on classifying investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
in China. Should Hong Kong’s investment in China be labeled as foreign investment? 
Even before July 1997 – when Hong Kong was officially under China’s jurisdiction, 
China’s official position was that Hong Kong is an integral part of China. Similarly, 
China considers Taiwan its sovereign territory and not an independent political entity. If 
one strictly adheres to this stance, then Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s investment is not 
“foreign” investment in China! In practice, however, Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s 
investment is treated as foreign investment in China and enjoys substantial preferential 
treatment. Thus, we follow the common practice and label Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s  
  8Table 2.  China’s Foreign Direct Investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan, in 
Million US Dollar 
 
 Hong  Kong  Taiwan 
A. Value     
1991 2405 466 
2002 17861 3971 
B. Proportion     
1991 0.55 0.11 
2002 0.34 0.08 
 
Notes:   Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s investments in China during the years 1991 and 2002 are presented. 
“Value” gives the UD dollar amount of investment and “Proportion” gives the ratio of the investment 
amount to China’s total foreign direct investment. 
 
investment in China as foreign investment in China. 
Hong Kong and Taiwan provide a large proportion of foreign direct investment to 
China (Table 2). The substantial presence of Hong Kong in these investment data is a 
testament to its role as a main platform for investment in China. The role was enhanced 
by China’s policies in her early phase of the reform program that aimed at attracting 
investment from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Clearly, Hong Kong’s domestic 
resources were not enough to account for the reported capital flow. In addition to its 
domestic sources, it is believed that Hong Kong investment in China was funded by a) 
capital originating in China that was invested back in China via Hong Kong entities in 
order to enjoy the preferential treatment not available to China’s own local capital, b) 
Taiwan’s investment in China that was channeled through Hong Kong in order to 
circumvent restrictions imposed by the Taiwanese authorities, and c) multinational 
corporations that used Hong Kong as the bridgehead to enter the Chinese market.  
Hong Kong, one of the renowned international finance centers, has a few 
advantageous features to facilitate capital flow to China. These features include a well-
established legal system, a business environment similar to other developed countries, an 
efficient financial sector, the kinship network, and expertise in China economy. The 
ability to perform the role of middleman to channel foreign capital into China has 
reinforced Hong Kong’s status as an international finance center.   
                                                                                                                                                 
11   Given the trend of the Taiwanese authorities to lift restrictions on imports from China, it is 
anticipated that there will be an increase of Chinese goods and merchandise in Taiwan and 
  9Both Chinese and Taiwanese data are perceived to under-report Taiwan’s 
investment interest in China. The official figures rank Taiwan’s investment in China 
behind Hong Kong, the US, and Japan. Nonetheless, the guesstimate usually puts Taiwan 
the second largest source only after Hong Kong. It is believed that a substantial amount 
of Taiwan’s interest in China is invested through, in addition to Hong Kong, the Virgin 
Islands. The investment flow from the Virgin Islands to China has been quite astonishing 
in the last ten years. In 1992, China received US$4 million foreign direct investment from 
the Virgin Islands and in 2002 the investment flow reached US$6.1 billion.
12  
Undeniably, the capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan plays an important role in 
China’s recent economic success. The two economies provided the lion’s share of foreign 
capital to China – a total of 66% in 1991 and of 42% in 2002. It is worth noting that both 
Hong Kong and Taiwan are not a major supplier in the world capital market. Their 
investment commitments in China are underpinned by China’s policy and the kinship 
network that spreads across the Greater China region. These investment opportunities 
allow the three Greater China economies to effectuate their complementary resources, 
foster their economic growth, and elevate Greater China to the world economic stage.  
 
3.   Preliminary analyses 
  As revealed in the preceding section, the three Greater China economies display a 
high level of economic integration. The extensive interaction between these economies 
provides a good foundation for advancing integration to a higher level. In this section, we 
present some basic properties of the output data. 
Quarterly China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan real per capita GDP data are 
considered. The sample period is 1994:I to 2002:IV. The sample period is mainly dictated 
by data availability and the liberalization process in China. Although China started its 
economic reforms in 1978, she had a substantially controlled economy before the early 
1990s. Extending the data series backward would not yield useful information relevant to 
our exercise. The data are retrieved from the CEIC and International Financial Statistics 
databases and are seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X12 method. For 
                                                                                                                                                 
China’s trade deficit situation may improve over time. 
12   See the Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues. 
  10brevity, the quarterly real per capita GDP data are referred to as GDP or output data 
henceforth. 
As a preliminary analysis, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test 
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Table 3.  Unit Root Test Results 
 China  Hong  Kong  Taiwan 
A. Levels     
Test Statistic   -2.71  -2.21  -1.45 
#  Lags  1 4 1 
Q-Statistics: Q(4)  7.131 0.526 1.744 
  (0.129) (0.971) (0.783) 
Q(8)  10.357 11.411  3.392 
  (0.241) (0.179) (0.859) 
B. First Differences     
Test Statistic   -8.31**  -3.95**  -4.08** 
# of Lags   1  3  0 
Q-Statistic: Q(4)  6.074 0.387 1.439 
  (0.194) (0.984) (0.837) 
Q(8)  6.339 9.786 2.827 
  (0.609) (0.280) (0.945) 
 
Note:  The results of applying augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to the China, Hong Kong and Taiwan real per 
capita GDP data are reported. Lags are selected to make the serial correlation in residuals insignificant. The Box-
Ljung statistics based on the first four and first eight serial correlations of the estimated residuals are given under 
the heading “Q(4) and Q(8)” and their p-values are given in parentheses underneath. “**” indicates significance 
at the 5% level (Cheung and Lai, 1995). 
 
 
  11where Xit is the economy i’s GDP at time t, expressed in logs, for i = China, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan,   is the first-difference operator, c  and t are, respectively, an intercept and 
time trend, and 
∆ i
it ε  is the associated error term. Under the unit-root hypothesis,  0 = i δ . 
The lag parameter (p) is chosen to eliminate serial correlation in the estimated residuals. 
The ADF test results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. For all three GDP series, 
the test statistics do not reject the unit root hypothesis. Panel B contains the results from 
first-differences of GDP data. In this case, only a constant term was included in the ADF 
regression equation. The first-differenced GDP data reject the unit root null hypothesis; 
that is, the first-differenced data are I(0) . As indicated by the Q-statistics, the lag 
specifications used to conduct these tests adequately capture the intertemporal GDP 
dynamics. These results strongly suggest that the GDP series are I(1) processes. 
 
4.  Long-Run and Short-Run Output Variations 
Since the GDP date are I(1), each series has a stochastic trend. Thus, we employ 
the Johansen cointegration procedure to test whether the three Greater China economies' 
GDP series share any common stochastic trend; that is, whether they are cointegrated. In 
addition to identifying common long-run comovement, the cointegration results help 
specify the appropriate model to study short-run output interactions and cycles. 
 
4.1   Common Stochastic Trend 
A currency union has implications for interactions between its member economies 
that go beyond bilateral relationships. In contrast with the usual bilateral setting 
embedded in most, if not all, recent studies on currency unions, the cointegration model 
is a multivariate framework that incorporates interactions between all data series in 
assessing output movement patterns. Further, the cointegration model provides a coherent 
structure to study output interactions in both the long run and short run. Specifically, we 
can infer whether the national output series move together in the long run, how deviations 
from the long-run relationship affect short-run output movements, and how outputs 
interact in the short run. The structure is flexible enough to accommodate various types 
of data dynamics in the analysis. 
  12The Johansen cointegration test procedure is conducted as follows. Suppose Xt is 








1 X X ,         ( 2 )  
where µ is the intercept term, and εt is the innovation vector. To test whether the elements 
in Xt are cointegrated, the Johansen procedure tests for significant canonical correlations 
between ∆Xt and Xt-p-1, after adjusting for all intervening lags. Johansen (1991) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1990), for example, give a detailed description of the test.  
The cointegration test results are reported in Table 4. Again, the lag parameter (p) 
is selected to obtain insignificant serial correlation in the residuals. According to both the 
maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected in favor of the presence of one cointegrating vector. Further, there is no evidence 
that there exists more than one cointegrating vector. These results suggest that the output 
series are cointegrated. That is, the stochastic trends that drive the individual output series 
to wander randomly over time are common to the three Greater China economies such 
that the output series have synchronous long-term movements. The empirical long-run 
relationship is given by the cointegrating vector. 
 
Table 4.  Cointegration Test Results 
H(0) Max.  Eigen.  Statistic Trace  Statistic 
r <=2  0.07  0.07 
r <=1  10.80  10.87 
r <=0  22.60**  33.40** 
 
Note:  The Johansen maximum eigenvalue test and trace test statistics are reported, respectively, under 
the headings “Max Eigen. Statistic” and “Trace Statistic.” The 5% level of significance is indicated by “**” 
(Cheung and Lai, 1993). The lag parameter is 2. The estimated cointegrating vector is (1, -1.66 –1.31) with 
the China coefficient normalized to 1. The test statistics for the cointegrating coefficients are 14.88 (China), 
20.71 (Hong Kong), and 12.17 (Taiwan); that is, each element of the cointegrating vector is significant. 
 
The cointegration of output data may be viewed as a necessary condition for 
establishing a currency union. If the output series are not cointegrated, they drift apart in 
the long run. In this case, it is difficult to effectively manage the three economies using a 
  13common monetary policy and a common currency. Thus, the cointegration result, which 
implies the national output data are synchronous in the long run, is supportive of the 
concept of a currency union between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
 
4.2   Short-Run Interaction 
Since the three GDP series are cointegrated, a vector error correction model 
(VECM), instead of a vector autoregressive model, is the appropriate framework to study 
their short-run interactions. The VECM is given by 
1 1
p
i ti t i t p Z t µ α = −− − ∆= + Γ ∆ + + ∑ XX ε        ( 3 )  
where Zt-p-1 is the error correction term given by   and   is the estimated 
cointegrating vector. The VECM results are presented in Table 5. The Q-statistics affirm 
that the selected VECM models adequately capture the data dynamics and the resulting 
disturbance terms display no statistically significant serial correlation. 
1 ' ˆ
− − p t X β β ˆ
The adjustment of output growth  t ∆X  to deviations from the empirical long-run 
relationship is captured by the α coefficient vector. The error correction term is 
significant in only the Kong Kong and Taiwan, but not the China, equations. That is, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan respond to deviations from the empirical long-run relationship, 
which is given by the cointegrating vector. On the other hand, China does not react to the 
deviation as the error correction term has a small and insignificant coefficient estimate. 
One interpretation of these α coefficient estimates is that China GDP causes both Hong 
Kong and Taiwan outputs in the long run, but not vice versa (Granger and Lin, 1995). 
The result seems reasonable. Since the 1980s, Hong Kong and Taiwan have invested a 
large amount of capital and relocated a large number of manufacturing facilities to China 
and, at the same time, China has become a significant export market for these two 
economies. In addition, the China economy is much larger than the Hong Kong and 
Taiwan ones. These factors have created complex economic linkages between the three 
Greater China economies and the reliance of the two small economies to the large one. 
The short-run dynamics are described by the Γi coefficient matrices, which relate 
output growth ( ) to short-term variation in lagged output movements. The three GDP 
growth equations display different responses to lagged GDP growth. The China  
t ∆X
  14Table 5.  China/Hong Kong/Taiwan Vector Error Correction Model 
 
 China  Hong  Kong  Taiwan 
      
ECT  -0.003 0.162**  0.141** 
 (-0.118)  (3.510)  (3.645) 
CH GDPG(-1)  -0.317**  -0.171  -0.094 
 (-2.025)  (-0.662)  (-0.434) 
CH GDPG(-2)  -0.410**  0.400*  0.252 
 (-2.987)  (1.766)  (1.333) 
HK GDPG(-1)  -0.031  0.438**  -0. 202 
 (-0.269)  (2.334)  (-1.288) 
HK GDPG(-2)   0.026  0.031  0.127 
 (0.236)  (0.169)  (0.837) 
TW  GDPG(-1) 0.099 -0.449** 0.041 
  (0.755) (-2.063) (0.223) 
TW GDPG(-2)  0.101  -0.125  -0.143 
 (0.737)  (-0.548)  (-0.751) 
Constant -0.055  4.128**  3.593** 
 (-0.078)  (3.509)  (3.648) 
      
2 R Adjusted −    0.162 0.489 0.  299 
      
Q(4) 6.631  7.053  2.023 
 (0.157)  (0.133)  (0.732) 
Q(8) 7.499  9.625  8.890 
 (0.484)  (0.292)  (0.352) 
 
Note:   The estimates of the vector error correction model for China (CH), Hong Kong (HK), and Taiwan 
(TW) are presented. GDPG refers to GDP growth. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses below the 
parameter estimates. “**” and “*” indicate significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. ECT is the 
error correction term. Q(p) is the Q-statistic calculated from the first p sample autocorrelations with the 
associated p-value given in parentheses underneath. 
 
economy, which is the largest among the three, depends only on its own lagged growth 
rates. The Hong Kong economy, on the other hand, responds to growth rates in all the 
three economies. The dependence of Hong Kong on the other two economies 
corroborates with its size and openness – Hong Kong is the smallest and the most open 
economy in the group.
13 No lagged GDP growth variable is significant in the Taiwan 
equation. Even though the economic links between China and Taiwan have increased 
  15quite substantially, our analysis reveals a significant China effect on Taiwanese growth 
rate only via the error correction term but not the lagged China GDP growth. 
 
4.3   Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Short-Run Cycles 
In addition to long-run trends, business cycle synchronization is a key element of 
designing a currency union arrangement. A common currency and a common monetary 
policy can be quite ineffective in managing and fine-tuning the economic activity in a 
currency union if shocks are asymmetric and national business cycles are asynchronous. 
On the other hand, a common monetary policy can be desirable when business cycles are 
synchronous across economies because there is less need for asymmetric monetary policy 
responses. In reality, the commonality of (short-run) cyclical movements is a crucial and 
practical aspect of policy coordination considerations.  
Since the cycle of an output growth series is often represented by its serial 
correlation, the presence of common serial correlation patterns is taken as evidence of 
common cyclical variations in business cycles. In this exercise, the common feature test 
(Engle and Kozicki, 1993; Vahid and Engle, 1993) is used to detect common serial 
correlations. The test is based on sample canonical correlations between ∆  and 
W(p) ( ) and determines the number of co-feature vectors. If there is 
common serial correlation, then there is a linear combination of the components of 
t X
≡ 1 1 , ,..., − − − ′ ∆ ′ ∆ t p t t Z X X
t X ∆ , 
defined by a co-feature vector, displays no serial correlation. The test statistic for the null 
hypothesis that there are at least s co-feature vectors is given by  
∑ = − − − − =
s
j j p T s p C
1 ) 1 ln( ) 1 ( ) , ( λ ,         ( 4 )  
where λj is the j-th smallest squared canonical correlations between  t X ∆  and W(p). The 
dimension (rank) of the co-feature space is the number of statistically zero squared 
canonical correlations. Under the null hypothesis, the statistic C(p,s) has a χ
2-distribution 
with s
2 + snp+ sr - sn degrees of freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13   The year 2002 PPP-based GDPs, in billions of US dollar, are 6,136 for China, 487 for Taiwan, and 
194 for Hong Kong. The levels of openness measured by the trade to GDP ratio are 2.54 for Hong 
Kong, 0.83 for Taiwan, and 0.48 for China at 2002. 
  16The presence of a common feature requires the component series to respond to 
stochastic shocks simultaneously with a similar pattern. If the component series have 
different initial responses to stochastic shocks, there will be no common feature. 
However, because of economy-specific factors including institutional structures and 
capital/labor input, the Greater China economies can have dis-similar initial responses to 
shocks, and shocks propagate through economies at uneven speeds. Despite different 
initial responses, these economies can react fully and symmetrically to the shock in later 
periods. This type of “non-synchronized” cycles might be difficult to detect using the 
common feature test statistic (4), which is designed to detect synchronized cycles. Vahid 
and Engle (1997) devise the codependence test to test for the presence of common but 
non-synchronized business cycles. Specifically, the test statistic for the null hypothesis 
that there are at least s codependence vectors after the k-th period is 
 
() () (, ,) ( 1 ) l n1 / 1
s Ckps T p k d k j jj λ     =− − − − ∑   =     
,      (5) 
where λn(k) ≥ ... ≥ λ1(k) are the squared canonical correlations between ∆Xt and W(k,p) 
 ( ≡ 1 ,..., , tk tkp t1 Z −− −− − ′′ XX ∆∆ ), and dj(k) is given by  
dj(k) = 1,   for k = 0, 
and 
1 () 1 2 ( ) (' (, ) )
k
jt dk X W k p υυ υ ρα ργ
= ′ =+ ∆ ∑  for  k ≥ 1,    
where  ) ( t y υ ρ  is the sample autocorrelation of yt at υ-th lag, α and γ are the canonical 
variates corresponding to 
j λ (k). Note that when k = 0, the codependence test statistic 
 is reduced to the common feature test statistic; that is, Cp ≡  . 
Under the null hypothesis, the statistic Ck has a χ
2-distribution with s
2 + snp + sr - 
sn degrees of freedom. 
(, Ck ,) ps (0, , ) s (,) Cps
(, ,) ps
The common feature and codependence test results are reported in Table 6. In Panel A, the 
hypothesis of one co-feature vector is not rejected but both the hypotheses of two and three co-feature 
vectors are rejected. That is, the Greater China GDP series share synchronized cyclical movements and 
there exists a linear combination of these output growth series that displays no significant serial correlation. 
Thus, in addition to common long-run trends, the three Greater China economies share common business 
cycles. 
 
  17Table 6. Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Cycles 
 
  Common Feature Test  Co-Dependence Test   














S  = 
1 
0.166 5.472  0.104 2.363  5 
S  = 
2 
0.417 21.659**  0.188  8.140  12 
S  = 
3 
0.909 93.807**  0.917 96.912** 21 
 
Note:  The common feature and codependence test results are reported. “s” gives the number of common 
feature or codependence vectors. Under the null hypothesis, the common feature test statistic C(p,s) and 
codependence test statistic C(p,k,s) have an asymptotic χ
2 distribution with  degrees of 
freedom, where, in this exercise, n = 3, p = 2, k = 1, and r =1. “**” indicates significance at the 5% level.  
sn sr snp s − + +
2
 
The co-dependence test results in Panel B are based on k = 1 and are indicative of 
the presence of two co-dependence vectors. In addition to synchronized business cycles, 
these Greater China economies also share non-synchronized business cycles. Since the 
co-dependence test is a generalized version of the common feature test, the synchronized 
cyclical component detected by the common feature test will also be detected by the co-
dependence test. It is appropriate to interpret that one of the two co-dependence vectors is 
the co-feature vector reported in Panel A. Overall, the results indicate that the Greater 
China economies share common business cycles – some are synchronized, and some are 
non-synchronized and display dis-similar patterns in the first quarter of the cycle. 
 
5.  Possible Output Losses 
There are both benefits and costs of forming a currency union. It is conceived that 
benefits come at the microeconomic level and derive from, for example, gains in 
economic efficiency, reduction in transaction costs (for both business and consumers), 
elimination of foreign exchange uncertainty, and improved cross-border price 
transparency. The typical costs are related to macroeconomic management. Joining a 
  18currency union implies the monetary authorities have to relinquish policy autonomy and 
lose the capacity to fine-tune the economy. When shocks to individual economies are not 
identical, a common monetary policy has limited scope to stabilize and offset effects of 
shocks on all its member economies. Thus, the inability of fine-tuning is a potential 
macro cost. Even though the three Greater China economies are quite well integrated, 
these economies are not likely to meet all the ideal pre-conditions of a currency union. 
Thus, it is instructive to investigate the potential cost of joining a currency union.
14 
   
5.1 The  Model 
Intuitively, the cost of giving up monetary policy autonomy is low if the union’s 
common monetary policy is effective in managing shocks to its member economies. The 
common monetary policy can be ineffective and the costs can be high if shocks to the 
economies are different and there are significant (nominal) rigidities. While it is not easy 
to evaluate these costs, we use the Ghosh and Wolf (1994) model to illustrate the possible 
consequences of relinquishing monetary policy autonomy. Specifically, the model 
assumes nominal wage rigidity to establish the benefits of autonomous monetary policy. 
Before joining a currency union, individual economies use their own monetary policies to 
fine-tune their economies in the presence of adverse shocks to achieve full employment. 
Under a currency union arrangement, however, a common monetary policy is used to 
combat a union-wise shock, which is a function of shocks to its member economies. 
Since the union-wise shock is not necessarily the same as individual shocks, the adoption 
of a common policy does not allow every member economy to achieve full employment 
simultaneously and, hence, induces the output cost of joining a currency union. 
Consider the scenario before joining a currency union. Let an economy’s output is 
given by 
α θ
t t l e Q
t = ,           ( 6 )  
where   is a productivity shock, l  is labor employed in period t, and  t θ t 1 0 < <α  is the 
labor share. The real wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. The nominal wage 
rate, wt, is downward sticky and is based on information available at t-1,  
                                                 
14   Evaluating the benefits of forming a currency union is an important and involving task that is 
beyond the scope of the current exercise.  
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where   is the price level, and   is the expectations operator based on information 
available at time t-1. It is assumed that the wage is set (given the expected price and 
expected productivity shock) to clear the labor market; thus, 
t p 1 − t E
l
≅
 is the equilibrium 
employment level. Since the nominal wage is only rigid downward, the wage rate adjusts 
to clear the market if the unexpected productivity shock   is positive. 
However, if the unexpected productivity shock   is negative, the wage rate does not 
move down and the actual ex post labor demand (l ) is given by 
t ε ) ( 1 t t t E θ θ − −
t ε
t
) log( ) log( ) 1 ( ) log( t t t t w l p = − + + α θ .       ( 8 )  
Note that l  does not represent the equilibrium employment level. If the economy is not 
in a currency union, monetary policies can be used to offset the adverse shock and restore 
labor market equilibrium by setting the price at the level 
t
. ) log( ) log( 1 t t t t p E p ε − = − −         ( 9 )  
In this case,  
) log( ) log( ) 1 ( ) log( t t t w l p = − + + α θ  
). log( ) 1 ( ) log( 1 1 l E p E t t t t − + + = − − α θ    (10) 
Now suppose the economy forms a currency union with another economy. Let the 
productivity shock to the currency union be  , which is a combination of shocks to the 
two member countries. Further, assume the currency union’s monetary authorities pursue 











t p E p ε − = − −
When  , the policy (11) does not yield full employment for the economy under 
consideration. From (6), (8) and (11), the economy’s output loss, in percentage term, is 
given by  
c
t t ε ε <
)] 1 /( ) exp[( 1 α α ε ε − − − =
c
t t t L .        ( 1 2 )  
Equation (12) summarizes the three factors that determine the output loss of joining a 
currency union: the shock to the economy  , the shock to the currency union  , and  t ε
c
t ε
  20the labor share α . See Ghosh and Wolf (1994) for a detailed discussion of the model, 
interpretations, and caveats.  
 
5.2  The Estimated Losses 
Equation (12), which offers a good initial approximation for quantifying the costs 
of joining a currency union, is used to assess the potential output losses. We calculate the 
output losses for each of the three Greater China economies and for Greater China as a 
whole. To accommodate various possible scenarios, the output losses are calculated from 
the following configurations: a) the labor share ranges from 0.3 to 0.7, b) two ways to 
characterize the currency union-wide shock – one is the GDP-weighted average of 
individual economies’ output shocks and the other is the simple average of individual 
economies’ output shocks, and c) three approaches to derive output shocks – one based 
on the VECM, one based on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and one based on the 
Blanchard-Quah (BQ) (1989) method. 
Table 7 presents the estimated average percentage output losses. The estimates 
based on the assumption that the currency union shock is the GDP-weighted average of 
individual economies’ shocks are given in columns 3 to 5 and those based on the 
assumption that the currency union shock is the simple average of individual economies’ 
shocks are given in columns 6 to 8. A few observations are in order. 
First, the estimates illustrate the role of labor share quite clearly. As indicated by 
equation (12), a larger labor share implies a larger percentage of output loss, which is a 
consequence of the nominal wage rigidity assumption. Indeed, when the labor share 
increases, the estimated output loss increases quite significantly. For instance, China’s 
percentage output loss estimate increases more than fivefold where the labor share 
parameter increases from 0.3 to 0.7. Similar changes in output losses are found in other 
economies. 
Second, the percentage output loss estimate appears quite sensitive to the method 
used to extract the shock. Under both currency union shock specifications, the HP filter 
yields the highest output loss estimates and the BQ method delivers the lowest estimates. 
The results highlight the importance of the shock-estimation method in evaluating the 
output loss of joining a currency union. The sensitivity of loss estimates to shock  
  21Table 7.  Estimated Average Output Losses in Percentages 
   GDP-Weighted  Average 
of Shocks 
  Simple Average of 
Shocks 
   VECM HP 
Filter 
BQ VECM HP 
Filter 
BQ 
α = 0.7  China 0.140  0.280  0.074  0.209  0.408  0.150 
 Hong  Kong  0.617  1.712  0.471  0.542  1.224  0.382 
 Taiwan  0.505  0.868  0.043  0.445  0.517  0.066 
 Greater 
China 
0.272 0.563 0.122  0.301 0.521 0.169 
α  = 0.6  China 0.090  0.181  0.048  0.134  0.263  0.096 
 Hong  Kong  0.399  1.111  0.305  0.350  0.792  0.247 
 Taiwan  0.326  0.563  0.028  0.287  0.334  0.043 
 Greater 
China 
0.175 0.365 0.079  0.194 0.337 0.109 
α  = 0.5  China 0.060  0.121  0.032  0.090  0.176  0.064 
 Hong  Kong  0.267  0.745  0.204  0.234  0.530  0.165 
 Taiwan  0.218  0.377  0.019  0.192  0.224  0.029 
 Greater 
China 
0.117 0.244 0.053  0.130 0.225 0.073 
α  = 0.4  China 0.040  0.080  0.021  0.060  0.117  0.043 
 Hong  Kong  0.178  0.498  0.137  0.156  0.354  0.110 
 Taiwan  0.146  0.252  0.012  0.128  0.149  0.019 
 Greater 
China 
0.078 0.163 0.035  0.087 0.150 0.049 
α  = 0.3  China 0.026  0.052  0.014  0.039  0.076  0.027 
 Hong  Kong  0.115  0.321  0.088  0.100  0.228  0.071 
 Taiwan  0.094  0.163  0.008  0.082  0.096  0.012 
 Greater 
China 
0.050 0.105 0.023  0.056 0.097 0.031 
 
Note:   “GDP-Weighted Average of Shocks” and “Simple Average of Shocks” give the estimated average 
percentage output losses based on the assumptions that the currency union shock is given by the GDP-
weighted average and by the simple average of shocks to its member countries. The row “Greater China” 
gives the losses for the three economies as a group. Results based on shocks estimated from the vector error 
correction model, the HP Filter, and the Blanchard-Quah method are, respectively, given under “VECM,” 
“HP Filter,” “BQ.” “α ” is the labor share parameter. 
 
extraction method is comparable to the sensitivity of the estimated benefits from free 
trade derived from different specifications reported in, for example, Brown et al. (2002) 
and Scollay and Gilbert (2001).  
  22Third, the rankings of output losses across the two specifications of currency 
union shocks are quite similar. For instance, Hong Kong has the highest percentage 
output loss estimates in all the cases under consideration. Its percentage output loss 
ranges from 0.071% (simple average, α = 0.3, BQ) to 1.712% (weighted-average, α = 
0.7, HP). China, on the other hand, has the smallest estimates when the shocks are 
extracted using either the VECM or HP filter approaches. The diverse output losses imply 
that the three Greater China economies can have different views on the prospect of 
forming a common currency union. China, for instance, has the lowest output cost and is 
likely to be more susceptible to the notion of a Greater China currency union than the 
other two economies. 
Fourth, there may be a debate on how to define the currency union shock. It is 
conceivable that China, the largest economy in the group, would prefer the policy abating 
the average of GDP-weighted shocks while Hong Kong, which is the smallest in the 
group, would favor the one that focuses on the simple average. In the case of China, the 
output loss estimates are always smaller when the GDP-weighted average is used. The 
opposite is true for Hong Kong. The result is quite intuitive because under the GDP-
weighted average definition, the stabilization policy is more responsive to shocks 
originated in a large economy. The Taiwan case is slightly different – its preference of 
the GDP-weighted average shock or the simple average shock depends on which shock-
extraction method is considered. For Taiwan, the notion of the GDP-weighted average 
shock is better under both the VECM and HP filter but not under the BQ setting. One 
possible way for China to persuade the other two economies to adopt the criterion of a 
GDP-weighted average shock is to re-distribute its gain to the other two economies. Such 
a possibility will be considered when we examine output losses in monetary terms. 
Fifth, the output loss of Greater China as an entity should be considered if the 
economies can compromise and reach a mutually agreeable re-distribution scheme. The 
figures reported under the row heading “Greater China” are quite small. There are only 
two cases in which the percentage output loss is larger than 0.5%, and two other cases in 
which the loss is larger than 0.3%. These high-end loss estimates are comparable to some 
estimates of the benefits of a currency union. For example, in an earlier study 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1990), it is estimated that the cost savings 
  23for the European countries to adopt a single currency are between 0.3% to 0.4% of the 
aggregate GDP. The benefit of price convergence, which is a plausible consequence of 
creating a currency union, is 0.55% of the world GDP (Hufbauer et al., 2002). Further, 
we should recall that the output loss is derived under the assumption that individual 
monetary authorities can perfectly fine-tune their economies and, thus, the output loss 
should be properly interpreted as an upper bound of potential losses. Thus, if a common 
currency for the three Greater China economies generates a similar magnitude of savings, 
then the benefits of forming a currency union can outweigh the estimated output losses. 
If shocks are accurately estimated by the VECM or the BQ method, Greater China 
will prefer the policy of managing the GDP-weighted average of shocks to individual 
economies because such a policy leads to a smaller percentage output loss. However, if 
the HP filter yields better estimates of shocks, then it is beneficial to pursue the policy of 
managing the simple average of shocks to individual economies. Thus, the results 
reinforce the relevance of the choice of shock-estimation method in evaluating issues 
related to a currency union. 
The loss estimates in Table 7 are derived from a range of labor share values. It is 
instructive to consider the losses corresponding to some “reasonable” estimates of labor 
shares in these economies. In her recent study, Harrison (2002) provides labor share 
estimates for a large number of economies. In this exercise, we adopt her 1993-1996 
labor share figures and calculate the corresponding output losses. Specifically, the labor 
share parameter is set to 0.36 for China and 0.49 for Hong Kong and Taiwan.
15  
The output losses calculated based on the specific set of labor shares are presented 
in Table 8. If the selected labor share figures are consistent with the economic structures 
of the three Greater China economies, then the output cost of forming a currency union is 
lower than the potential benefit estimated in Commission of the European Communities 
(1990). While the potential gain can offset the potential loss in forming a currency union, 
there is a re-distribution issue. As evidenced in the Table, the output loss of Hong Kong 
can be quite high – more than 0.7% according to the HP filter approach under the GDP-
weighted average policy. At the same time, a small economy is likely to achieve a low 
                                                 
15   We assume China is a member of Harrison’s “bottom-middle” income group, and Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are members of the “upper middle” income group. 
  24level of cost savings from gain in economic efficiency and reduction in transaction costs. 
Thus, without an appropriate re-distribution scheme or other economic incentives, a small 
economy may not elect to join the union because the cost can be higher than the benefit.
16 
Obviously, there are other (economic and political) factors affecting the decision of 
joining a currency union. Nonetheless, our discussion offers one perspective to evaluate 
the situation. 
 
Table 8.  Estimated Average Output Losses in Percentages Based on a Specific Set 
of Labor Share Values 
  
 GDP-Weighted  Average  of 
Shocks 
  Simple Average of Shocks 
 VECM HP  Filter BQ   VECM HP  Filter BQ 
           
China  0.034 0.068 0.018    0.051 0.099 0.036 
Hong  Kong 0.256 0.716 0.197    0.225 0.509 0.159 
Taiwan  0.210 0.363 0.018    0.184 0.215 0.027 
Greater 
China 
0.096 0.204 0.042    0.100 0.171 0.052 
 
Note:   The percentage output loss estimates are based on the labor share values: 0.36 for China and 0.49 
for both Hong Kong and Taiwan (Harrison, 2002). See the “Note” to Table 7 for detail. 
 
The output losses in billions of 1994 US dollar are presented in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9 gives the loss estimates from a range of labor share values and Table 10 contains 
estimates from the selected set of labor share figures for the three Greater China 
economies. The patterns of output losses are similar to those in Tables 7 and 8. For 
instance, the output loss increases with the labor share parameter, the shocks calculated 
from the HP filter yield the largest loss estimates, and those from the BQ approach yield 
the smallest estimates. 
                                                 
16   For instance, an early access of the huge Chinese market can provide a strong incentive for Hong 
Kong to join a Greater China currency union. 
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Table 9.  Estimated Average Output Losses in Billions of US Dollar 
  
   GDP-Weighted  Average  of 
Shocks 
  Simple Average of Shocks 
   VECM HP 
Filter 
BQ   VECM HP 
Filter 
BQ 
              
α  = 0.7  China  0.349 0.595  0.167    0.546 0.890  0.399 
  Hong  Kong  0.237 0.677  0.176    0.207 0.482  0.143 
  Taiwan  0.341 0.628  0.030    0.301 0.371  0.046 
              
α  = 0.6  China  0.225 0.383  0.107    0.351 0.574  0.257 
  Hong  Kong  0.153 0.439  0.114    0.134 0.312  0.092 
  Taiwan  0.220 0.407  0.019    0.194 0.240  0.029 
              
α  = 0.5  China  0.150 0.256  0.072    0.235 0.383  0.171 
  Hong  Kong  0.102 0.294  0.076    0.089 0.209  0.062 
  Taiwan  0.147 0.273  0.013    0.130 0.161  0.020 
              
α  = 0.4  China  0.100 0.171  0.048    0.156 0.256  0.114 
  Hong  Kong  0.068 0.197  0.051    0.060 0.139  0.041 
  Taiwan  0.098 0.183  0.009    0.087 0.107  0.013 
              
α  = 0.3  China  0.064 0.110  0.031    0.101 0.165  0.073 
  Hong  Kong  0.044 0.127  0.033    0.038 0.090  0.027 
  Taiwan  0.063 0.118  0.006    0.056 0.069  0.008 
 
Note:  The estimated average output losses in billions of US dollar are reported. See the “Note” to Table 
7 for detail.  
 
Table  10.  Estimated Average Output Losses in billions of US dollar Based on a 
Specific Set of Labor Share Values 
  
 GDP-Weighted  Average  of 
Shocks 
  Simple Average of Shocks 
 VECM HP  Filter BQ   VECM HP  Filter BQ 
           
China  0.084 0.144 0.040    0.132 0.216 0.096 
Hong  Kong 0.098 0.283 0.073    0.086 0.201 0.059 
Taiwan  0.141 0.262 0.012    0.125 0.154 0.019 
 
Note:   The estimated average output losses in billions of US$ are based on the labor share values: 0.36 
for China and 0.49 for both Hong Kong and Taiwan (Harrison, 2002). See the “Note” to Table 7 for detail. 
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With the loss expressed in monetary terms, we can assess if, say, China has the 
incentive to pay the other two economies to adopt the policy of smoothing the GDP-
weighted average of individual shocks. For results in both Tables 9 and 10, the answer 
depends on which shock-extraction method is used to calculate the output losses. If either 
the VECM or the BQ method is used, then China’s gain from adopting the GDP-
weighted average instead of the simple average target is large enough to offset the 
corresponding losses incurred by Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, if the HP filter is 
used, then Hong Kong and Taiwan together have an incentive to pay off China to adopt 
the policy of managing the simple average of individual shocks. 
Overall, the loss calculation reveals that possible output losses resulting from 
forming a Greater China currency union are moderate. Further, the estimated losses are 
likely to be smaller than the potential gains of forming a currency union estimated by 
some previous studies. Arguably, these loss estimates and the results presented in the 
previous sections are supportive of the notion of a Greater China currency union.  
 
6. Concluding  Remarks 
  The three Greater China economies namely China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have 
experienced a rapid pace of integration since China launched economic reforms two 
decades ago. This paper assesses the current level of integration and investigates whether 
the three Greater China economies are suitable for a currency union. Currently, the three 
economies have extensive trade and investment linkages. Our analyses show that these 
economies share common long-run and short-run cyclical variations. The potential output 
costs of relinquishing policy autonomy seem to be moderate and are likely to be less than 
the efficient gains derived from a currency union arrangement.
17 Further, some extant 
studies (Corestti and Pesenti, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Engel and Rose, 2002) show 
that the implementation of a currency union can induce structural changes that facilitate 
integration and increase the strength of common business cycles. While our focus is the 
suitability of a Greater China currency union, our results are complementary to other 
  27studies that, using different approaches, infer Asian economies are not unsuitable for a 
currency union. 
Despite the positive evidence, it is fair to consider the hurdles along the path to a 
currency union. Eichengreen (2001) and Wyplosz (2002), for example, point out that the 
making of a currency union goes beyond the economic preconditions, and the Asian 
region lacks a) the tradition, b) the institutional setting, and c) the political climate to 
facilitate integration. These issues are relevant to the discussion of a Greater China 
currency union. For instance, segments of populations in these economies are quite 
agonistic about the legacies of war, differences in political structures, and communism. 
The escalated political squabbles between China and Taiwan and the desire for 
democracy expressed by Hong Kong people, for instance, are likely to create undulations 
along the path to a currency union. Another challenge is the costs of adjustment. China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan are at different stages of economic development. The difference 
can lead to huge gains from trade and integration and, at the same time, create serious 
adjustment problems. For instance, it is believed that China has hollowed out the 
manufacture sector in Hong Kong and a similar process is happening to the manufacture 
sector in Taiwan.  
 There are both economic and non-economic obstacles to form a Greater China 
currency union in the near term. However, the prospect is quite encouraging. China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan have common history, culture, and language, and share an 
extensive kinship network. These are good catalysts for integration. For both historical 
reasons and political reality, China has a stronger link with Hong Kong than with Taiwan. 
It is conceivable that the pace of integration between China and Hong Kong will be 
enhanced by their 2003 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement and the on-going 
discussion on the development of the Pearl River Delta economic region. 
There are differences between China and Taiwan. However, it is hard to perceive 
these differences will last for too long and significantly hinder economic interactions 
between China and Taiwan. Given the existing economic ties, any severe political and 
military conflicts can inflict a huge cost on both economies. Even though she is agonistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
17   One caveat is in order. The empirical results are derived from existing data. Given the rapid 
developments in these countries; especially in China, the future could look very different from 
  28about Taiwan’s attempts to engage in any bilateral and multilateral trade agreement as a 
sovereign country, China is willing to negotiate a trade agreement with Taiwan.
18 As 
mentioned earlier, the current integration process between the three Greater China 
economies is proceeding more along de facto than de jure lines. Usually, institutional 
changes are made to accommodate economic developments in these economies. There is 
a possibility that the road to a Greater China currency union is led by economic 
considerations rather than politics. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
what can be inferred from these empirical results. 
18   People’s Daily Online (2003). 
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